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PARTIES BELOW 
On February 6, 2010, Mr. Stringham, Appellant/Defendant was charged with 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Operating a Vehicle without an Ignition 
Interlock System and Alcohol Restricted Driver violation. A jury trial was held on 
November 22, 2010 and Mr Stringham was convicted by the jury on all counts. On 
January 11, 2011, was Mr Stringham was sentenced. A Notice of Appeal was timely 
filed on February 11, 2011. This being a criminal matter the State of Utah is the 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103(e), the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction 
of a first degree capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF 
OPERATING A VEHICLE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK SYSTEM 
"The function of the reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient 
competent evidence regarding each element of the charge to enable the jury to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Warden. 
813 P.2d 1146,1150 (Utah 1991). When reviewing claims for insufficiency of the 
evidence, "the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." Id- It is proper to overturn a 
conviction when the evidence "is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that a jury 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." Id. 
This issue was not challenged in the trial court, and thus was not expressly 
preserved for appeal. Normally, an issue not raised in the court below is waived. State v. 
Holgate. 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346. However, there is an exception in the case of 
plain error if (1) the record shows that the error would plainly have been apparent to the 
trial court, and the substantive rights of the defendant were prejudiced thereby. State v. 
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Dean. 2004 UT 63, [^15, 95 P.3d 276. Additionally, Mr. Stringham asserts that he should 
be able to assert this issue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106. 
II. MR. STRINGHAM RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
AT HIS JURY TRIAL 
"Effective assistance of counsel arguments raised for the first time on appeal are 
questions of law reviewed for correctness." State v. Vos, 2007 UT App. 215, |9, 164 P.3d 
1258. To make a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, "the defendant must show 
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and such "deficiencies in counsel's 
performance must be prejudicial to the defense." Id, at 692. "Any judicial scrutiny of 
counsel's performance must be "highly deferential." Id, at 689. This issue is raised for the 
first time on a p p e a l . . , . . . . . . , 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Sixth Amendment. United States Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 
Article L Section 12. Utah Constitution: "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel..." 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 6, 2010, Mr. Stringham was charged with Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a Third Degree Felony due to prior convictions, in violation of 
U.C.A. §41-6a-502, Operating a Vehicle without an Ignition Interlock System, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §4 l-6a-518.2(3), and Alcohol Restricted Driver, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-530. (R.1-2). He waived preliminary 
hearing on May 19, 2010, (R.20-21). A jury trial was held on November 22, 2010. 
(R.82-83; R. 140). Mr Stringham was convicted by the jury on all counts, and on January 
11, 2011, was sentenced to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison on the felony 6 
months concurrently on each of the misdemeanors. (R.124-125). A Judgment and Order 
of Commitment was filed on January 11,2011, (R. 127-130), and Notice of Appeal was 
timely filed on February 11, 2011. (R. 131 -132). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 6, 2010, Officer Michael Gledhill of Vernal City Police Department 
conducted a traffic stop in which Mr. Stringham was arrested for operating a vehicle 
without an ignition interlock device installed among other violations. (R. 262). The 
presence of the interlock device in the vehicle was discussed briefly during the jury trial. 
When discussing the restrictions placed on Mr. Stringham's license, Officer Gledhill 
stated that there was no interlock device in the vehicle. (R. 267-268). However, when 
asked by the state upon direct examination whether the car was equipped with an 
-3-
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interlock device, Officer Gledhill testified that when he first approached the vehicle, he 
observed that the car was equipped with an ignition interlock system. (R. 268). Officer 
Gledhill then took the driver's identification and driver's license. When he checked with 
dispatch, he discovered that the driver, Mr. Stringham, was to have an interlock device 
installed in his vehicle before it could be operated or driven on a roadway. (R. 267-268). 
When the officer returned to the vehicle and later during the impound of the vehicle, he 
noticed that the ignition interlock device was no longer present. (R. 268). 
Mr. Stringham was never asked directly at trial, by either the State or the defense, 
whether his vehicle was equipped with an ignition interlock device at the time, however, 
he did testify that he didn't think he needed one because his driver's license said "No 
restrictions," and he was off probation. (R. 292). Ultimately, Mr. Stringham was 
convicted by the Jury of Operating a Vehicle without an Ignition Interlock System. (R. 
315). The defense failed to motion for dismissal when the State rested is case, failed to 
motion for directed verdict, and failed to make any post-trial motions including a motion 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict so as to expressly preserve the issue for 
appeal. (R. 288-322). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury verdict which convicted Mr. Stringham of Operating a Vehicle without an 
Ignition Interlock System should be reversed. The record clearly demonstrates insufficient 
evidence to support the conviction. The only evidence presented at trial to prove the lack 
-4-
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of the ignition interlock system in the vehicle was the testimony of the arresting officer 
that he noticed the device installed in the vehicle when Mr. Stringham was first detained, 
but later he was unable to locate the device. Mr. Stringham acknowledges that this issue 
was not expressly preserved for appeal but asserts that it falls under the exception of plain 
error set forth in State v. Dean. 2004 UT 63, If 15, 95 P.3d 276. 
Additionally, Mr. Stringham respectfully asserts that the Court should find that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial, bringing about a wrongful 
conviction. Due to the ineffective assistance of counsel Mr. Stringham believes the lack 
of evidence should have been, but was not raised at trial. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-
106(3) grants an exception to the rule that failure to raise an issue at trial precludes post-
conviction relief. Specifically, Utah statute provides that " . . . a person may be eligible 
for relief on the basis that the ground could have* been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY VERDICT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THERE WAS 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF 
OPERATING A VEHICLE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK SYSTEM 
The proper standard of review for appeals concerning the sufficiency of evidence 
is well established. In State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146 (1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth that: 
"The function of the reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is 
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sufficient competent evidence regarding each element of the charge to 
enable the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
committed the crime. Therefore, when reviewing a claim for insufficiency 
of the evidence, the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. 
It is only when the evidence, viewed in this light, is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to the defendant's guilt that it is proper to overturn the conviction." Id. at 
1150. 
Mr. Stringham was convicted of Operating a Vehicle without an Interlock System 
in violation of U.C.A. §4 l-6a-518.2(3). This statute states, "An interlock restricted driver 
that operated or is in actual physical control of a vehicle in this state without an ignition 
interlock system is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." Thus, a necessary element for a 
violation of this statute is that a defendant must be operating a vehicle without the 
interlock system. There is no evidence presented at trial that could convince a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Stringham operated the vehicle without an ignition interlock 
system. 
The only direct evidence presented at trial attempting to prove that Mr. Stringham 
did not have an ignition interlock device installed in the vehicle was the testimony 
provided by the arresting officer, Officer Gledhill. After explaining what an interlock 
device is, the following exchange took place during the State's direct examination of 
Officer Gledhill. Said exchange went as follows: 
"Mr. Thomas: Did you identify whether or not that car was equipped with 
that type of interlock device? 
Officer Gledhill: Yes, when I first approached I did notice one, and then 
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after I found this information, and later during the impound of 
the vehicle, there was no interlock in the vehicle." (R. 268). 
Officer Gledhill unambiguously stated that when he first approached the vehicle he 
noticed the interlock device. This statement reveals that Mr. Stringham was in fact 
operating the vehicle with the interlock device. At trial, Mr. Stringham was not 
questioned directly by either the State or defense counsel whether he was driving without 
the interlock system. (R. 289-296). Although Mr. Stringham testified that he believed he 
no longer needed to have an interlock device installed, he did not admit to driving without 
one. Therefore, the only direct evidence on the issue is that the interlock device was 
installed when the vehicle was operated by Mr. Stringham. 
Even if viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, it is implausible that 
a jury, relying on this statement alone, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Stringham was operating the vehicle without an interlock device. In considering this same 
issue in a civil context, it has been held that when there is no direct evidence jurors would 
have to engage in "rank speculation to reach a verdict." Clark v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange. 893 P.2d 598, 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The conviction should be overturned 
for lack of sufficient evidence because the evidence is "so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt" Warden, at 1150. 
-7-
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II. MR. STRINGHAM RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
HIS JURY TRIAL. 
If this Court decides that the issue of challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
for the Operating a Vehicle without an Ignition Interlock System conviction has not been 
preserved for appeal, Appellant respectfully submits that the court should nevertheless 
consider the appeal under the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel. Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-9-106(3) grants an exception to the rule that failure to raise an issue at trial 
precludes postconviction relief. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106(3) states, " . . . 
a person may be eligible for relief on the basis that the ground could have been but was 
not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel." Furthermore, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States grants that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . 
. to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. VI. Speaking of 
this constitutional right, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the right to counsel 
is the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
771,n.l4(1970). 
In order to successfully assert ineffective assistance of Counsel a defendant must 
meet both components of the test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient to a degree that "counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed by the sixth amendment." Id, at 687. Second, "the defendant must show that 
-8-
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the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. 
A. Counsel's Performance was Objectively Deficient 
In light of all the circumstances, Mr. Humiston's "acts or omissions were outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Strickland, at 690. "When a 
convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the 
defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Id, at 687-688. Put another way, "The proper measure of attorney 
performance remains simply reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms." Id, 
at 688. 
Mr. Stringham was convicted because the jury found that he was operating the 
vehicle without the presence of the ignition interlock system. Officer Gledhill's testimony 
was that he initially saw the device in the vehicle. (R. 268). Officer Gledhill did testify 
that later in the investigation and during the process of impounding the vehicle he did not 
see the device. On cross examination, Mr. Humiston did not address Officer Gledhill's 
testimony that he observed an interlock device when he first approached the vehicle. (R. 
285-298). When the State rested, Mr. Humiston did not move to dismiss for lack of 
evidence. (R. 288). Before the jury was allowed to deliberate, Mr. Humiston elected not 
make a motion for directed verdict based on the evidence regarding the interlock device. 
In closing argument, Mr. Humistion failed to even address the testimony from Officer 
Gledhill that his client actually had an interlock device on the vehicle when the initial stop 
-9-
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was made. (R. 307-311). Lastly, when the jury returned the guilty verdict on these facts, 
Mr. Humiston failed to motion the court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict so as to 
clearly preserve the issue for appeal. (R.316-322). 
Mr. Stringham respectfully asserts that Mr. Humsiton's failure to address the 
evidence constitutes a gross oversight. While it is true that strong deference is applied 
toward counsel's judgments, the Court must determine whether, "in light of all the 
circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." Strickland, at 690. The lack of an ignition interlock 
device is a essential element of the violation of which Mr. Stingham was being charged. 
To leave this issue unaddressed at trial when the evidence is so strongly in the favor of 
the defendant is not reasonable "under the prevailing professional norms." Id, at 688. Mr. 
Humiston did not fulfil his "duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render 
the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." Id, at 688. Mr. Humiston allowed the State 
to continually assert that Mr. Stringham was operating the vehicle without the interlock 
device without bringing to the attention of the jury that the evidence addressing the issue 
displayed that Officer Gledhill initially saw the device in the vehicle. The performance 
rendered by Mr. Humiston fails to meet the "objective standard of reasonableness" (Id, at 
687-688), and is therefore deficient as required by the first step of the Strickland analysis. 
-10-
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Stringham's class B misdemeanor conviction for 
violation of U.C.A. §41-6a-518.2(3), Operating a Vehicle without an Ignition Interlock 
System, should be reversed. 
Dated this 2 3 _ day of July, 2012. 
William L. Reynolds 
-12-
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B. A Reasonable Probability Exists that but for the Deficient Conduct, 
Mr. Stringham would have Obtained a More Favorable Outcome at 
Trial. 
"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting 
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." 
Id, at 691. 'The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Id, at 694. 
It is clear that the result of the jury verdict would have been different if Mr. 
Humiston had addressed the statements made by Officer Gledhill concerning the presence 
of the ignition interlock device. The evidence does not support the finding that the device 
was not present at the time Mr. Stringham was stopped by the officer. The testimony of 
Officer Gledhill points to the conclusion that the vehicle was equipped with the interlock 
device at the time Mr. Stringham was initially approached by the Officer. (R. 268). This is 
not disputed by any direct facts in the record. The trial jury would likely have come to the 
opposite conclusion had Mr. Humiston argued to the jury that Mr. Stringham's vehicle 
was equipped with an ignition system in light of the evidence. The second requirement of 
Strickland is easily met here. There is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial 
would have been different had Mr. Humiston argued that Mr. Stringham was operating 
the vehicle with the interlock device installed. 
-11-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served by U.S. Mail on July 2&~ 2012 as 
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John J. Nielsen, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney Generals 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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Uintah County Attorney 
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IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARL DEAN STRINGHAM, 
DOB: 06/24/1954, 
• Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT 
Case No. 101800086 
Judge Edwin T. Peterson 
OFFENSE: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS 
DEGREE: THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
OFFENSE: OPERATING OR BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A 
VEHICLE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK SYSTEM 
DEGREE: CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
OFFENSE: ALCOHOL RESTRICTED DRIVER 
DEGREE: CLASS B MISDEMEANOR 
This matter came on for sentencing on January 11, 2011, 
before the Honorable Edwin T. Peterson. The Plaintiff was 
represented by G. Mark Thomas, Uintah County Attorney. Defendant 
was personally present and represented by Counsel, Michael L. 
Humiston. The Court heard statements from counsel for the 
1-3HI 
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parties, and based upon these statements and the record before 
the Court: 
The Defendant, having been convicted of the crime(s) of (I) 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, in violation 
of Section 41-6a-502 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; (II) 
OPERATING OR BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE 
WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK SYSTEM, in violation of Section 41-
6a-518.2(3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; and (III) 
ALCOHOL RESTRICTED DRIVER, in violation of Section 41-6a-530 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and the Court having inquired 
of Defendant as to whether he had any statement he desired to 
make; and no legal reason having been shown why judgment and 
sentencing should not be imposed; 
IT IS ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant is guilty of 
the crime (s) of (I) DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR 
DRUGS, a third degree felony; (II) OPERATING OR BEING IN ACTUAL 
PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE WITHOUT AN IGNITION INTERLOCK 
SYSTEM, a class B misdemeanor; and (III) ALCOHOL RESTRICTED 
DRIVER, a class B misdemeanor. 
Defendant is hereby sentenced on (I) to serve not less than 
zero (0) nor more than five (5) years in the Utah State Prison. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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& 
each. Said jail sentence on (II) and (III) may be served at the 
prison concurrent to the prison sentence being served. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of 
the Uintah County Sheriff for transportation to the Utah State 
Prison and execution of the sentence given herein. 
DATED this 3S* day of January, 2011. 
/in T. Peterson 
)istrict Colurt Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MICHAfeL L. HUMISTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivered a true copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMITMENT to Michael L. Humiston, Attorney for Defendant, 134 
West Main, Suite 202, Vernal, UT 84032; Department of 
Corrections, 152 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078; Uintah 
County Jail, Vernal, Utah 84078; and Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 
250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
DATED this pj) day of January, 2011. 
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41-6a-518.2. Interlock restricted driver — Penalties for operation without ignition 
interlock system. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "ignition interlock system" means a constant monitoring device or any similar device that: 
(i) is in working order at the time of operation or actual physical control; and 
(ii) is certified by the Commissioner of Public Safety in accordance with Subsection 
41-6a-518(8);and 
(b) (i) "interlock restricted driver" means a person who: 
(A) has been ordered by a court or the Board of Pardons and Parole as a condition of 
probation or parole not to operate a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock system; 
(B) within the last 18 months has been convicted of a driving under the influence violation 
under Section 41-6a-502 that was committed on or after July 1, 2009; 
(C) (I) within the last three years has been convicted of an offense that occurred after May 1, 
2006 which would be a conviction as defined under Section 41-6a-501; and 
(II) the offense described under Subsection (l)(b)(i)(C)(I) is committed within 10 years from 
the date that one or more prior offenses was committed if the prior offense resulted in a 
conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2); 
(D) within the last three years has been convicted of a violation of this section; 
(E) within the last three years has had the person's driving privilege revoked for refusal to 
submit to a chemical test under Section 41-6a-520, which refusal occurred after May 1, 2006; 
(F) within the last three years has been convicted of a violation of Section 41-6a-502 and was 
under the age of 21 at the time the offense was committed; 
(G) within the last six years has been convicted of a felony violation of Section 41-6a-502 for 
,,. an offense that occurred after May 1, 2006: or 
(H) within the last 10 years has been convicted of automobile homicide under Section 
76-5-207 for an offense that occurred after May 1, 2006; and 
(ii) "interlock restricted driver" does not include a person if: 
(A) the person's conviction described in Subsection (l)(b)(i)(C)(I) is a conviction under 
Section 4 l-6a-517; and 
(B) all of the person's prior convictions described in Subsection (l)(b)(i)(C)(II) are 
convictions under Section 41-6a-517. 
(2) For purposes of this section, a plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of Section 
41-6a-502 which plea was held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, prior 
to July 1, 2008, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently 
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(3) An interlock restricted driver that operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle in 
this state without an ignition interlock system is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of a violation of Subsection (3) if: 
(i) an interlock restricted driver: 
(A) operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle owned by the interlock restricted 
driver's employer; 
(B) had given written notice to the employer of the interlock restricted driver's interlock 
restricted status prior to the operation or actual physical control under Subsection (4)(a)(i); and 
(C) had on the interlock restricted driver's person or in the vehicle at the time of 
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operation or physical control proof of having given notice to the interlock restricted driver's 
employer; and 
(ii) the operation or actual physical control under Subsection (4)(a)(i)(A) was in the scope of 
the interlock restricted driver's employment. 
(b) The affirmative defense under Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to: 
(i) an employer-owned motor vehicle that is made available to an interlock restricted driver 
for personal use; or 
(ii) a motor vehicle owned by a business entity that is all or partly owned or controlled by the 
interlock restricted driver. 
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78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief — Exception. 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have 
been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
(2) (a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during 
the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that 
the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier time. 
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives 
the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the 
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground 
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the exception 
set forth in Subsection (3). 
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs 
and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) (i) a final order or decree resulting from: 
(A) a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency; or 
(B) a permit review adjudicative proceeding, as defined in Section 19-1-301.5; or 
(ii) an appeal from the district court review of an informal adjudicative proceeding of an 
agency other than the following: 
(A) the Public Service Commission; 
(B) the State Tax Commission; 
(C) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(D) the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources; 
(E) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(F) the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or 
charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a 
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited 
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court 
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over 
which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Appellee, 
vs. 
CARL STRINGHAM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 20110155 
District Court Case No. 101800086 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, 
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1. This brief complies with the Type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. 
P.24(f)(l) because this brief contains 2936 words, excluding the parts of the brief 
exempted by Utah R. App. P24(f)(l)(B). 
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P27(b) 
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Word 
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DATED this 23^ day of July, 2012. 
SAM, REYNOLDS & EVERSHED, P.C. 
William L. .Reynolds 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
